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Abstract 
 
Laffiteau, Charles A. “Why Have The Relatively Successful Attempts To Govern 
The World’s Production Of Chlorofluorocarbons Not Been Duplicated in Other 
Areas of Global Environmental Protection?” Climate change due to global 
warming is but one of many issues confronting countries that they cannot successfully 
deal with on their own. The purpose of this paper is to ascertain why international 
attempts by governments and institutions to forestall climate change by regulating and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions have not been successful. The question is 
answered through an empirical study of the international politics of regulating 
chemicals which lead to ozone depletion and comparing this with the politics 
surrounding CO2 emissions. Part I reviews the world‘s growing awareness of global 
environmental issues and the relatively successful attempts which have been made to 
govern the production of chlorofluorocarbons. Part II examines the growing influence 
of environmental NGOs on government‘s response to concerns about environmental 
degradation and the unsuccessful attempts by states to prevent climate change by 
reducing their carbon gas emissions. Part III compares and contrasts the politics of 
ozone depletion with the political complexity of the problem of climate change 
brought on by global warming and analyzes alternative strategies for regulating the 
production of greenhouse gas emissions and reducing deforestation. The Conclusions 
section then offers suggestions on how greenhouse gas emissions might be regulated 
by governments in the near term (utilizing existing laws and treaties), and even more 
effectively in the future, by developing new international environmental governance 
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The purpose of this essay is to assess why the relatively successful attempts to 
govern the global production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) have not been duplicated 
in other areas of global environmental protection. In Part I, awareness of global 
environmental issues and the specific problem of ozone depletion is examined as well 
as the relatively successful attempts which have been made to govern the production 
of CFCs, which are the main contributor to ozone depletion. Part II will discuss the 
rising influence of environmental NGOs, global climate change due to the effects of 
global warming as well as unsuccessful attempts to regulate green house gas 
emissions, which are the primary cause of this problem. The Conclusions section will 
then compare and contrast the global politics of ozone depletion with the political 
complexity of the problem of climate change due to global warming, and offer some 
analysis and suggestions on how to govern the problem of green house gas emissions. 
Part I 
The issues surrounding the need to protect our global environment have only 
recently come to light over the last fifty years, dating to the 1962 publication of 
biologist Rachel Carson‘s groundbreaking book, Silent Spring, which detailed the 
global environmental effects of the use of a pesticide known as DDT.
1
 As a result of 
the world wide publicity which resulted from the publication of this book, problems 
with the environment could no longer be avoided. ―Before, the problem was not felt, 
for three main reasons. First, industrial developments had not spawned pollution and 
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damage to the environment on a very large scale. Second, States still took a traditional 
approach to their international dealings: they looked upon them as relations between 
sovereign entities, each pursuing its self-interest.….and unmindful of general or 
community amenities. Third, public opinion was not yet sensitive to the potential 
dangers of industrial and military developments to a healthy (global) environment.‖2 
Public awareness of environmental issues and our sensitivity regarding how 
they impact all nation states civil societies has risen dramatically since the 1960s. 
Environmental issues can and do have profound impacts on national and international 
political economy. While states officials are also aware of the problems caused by 
environmental degradation and abuse, they are often reluctant to take the steps needed 
to curb such abuses lest they offend special interest groups. The costs for businesses 
and multinational corporations (MNCs) of addressing the environmental problems 
they facilitate or of adhering to new environmental regulations, are most often seen as 
onerous with negative economic impacts on their current and future profitability.  
This explains why many MNCs have moved their operations to other countries 
with lax environmental rules in an effort to avoid paying for these costs. ―Likewise as 
governments and consumers in the (wealthier nations of the) North have restricted or 
banned a number of tobacco products, pharmaceuticals and pesticides, global 
marketing (by MNCs) has created new outlets for these goods in the (developing 
countries of the) South and East.‖3 To further illustrate this point; ―Nearly a third of 
pesticides exported from the North (and West) have been outlawed, unregistered or 
withdrawn in the country of manufacture.‖4 But now that scientists can prove that 
many of products we use or consume are causing irreparable damage to our global 
environment, society must make difficult decisions about who will pay for this harm. 
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The reluctance of states to take action with respect to environmental issues has 
helped facilitate the formation of environmental non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), which lobby consumers and public officials in nation states and international 
institutions around the world on behalf of policies that are environmentally sensitive. 
Environment NGOs have been moderately successful thus far in raising overall global 
public awareness and in one particular instance, pressuring most countries to sign an 
international agreement to deal with the environmental issue of ozone depletion. ―To 
be sure, we have developed some potentials for global governance of environmental 
matters. In this respect the ozone regime established through the 1985 Vienna 
Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol has proved particularly successful.‖5  
But several factors beyond the control of the government signatories to the 
treaties governing ozone depletion contributed to the success of negotiating them. The 
most important of these was that DuPont Corporation‘s scientists were able to develop 
an economically suitable replacement chemical that was a functional equivalent for 
ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Another aspect was that CFCs were 
used primarily in car, home and office building air-conditioning systems, uses which 
were not generally considered essential outside of certain developed countries. The 
other contributing factor was that since there were only limited uses for CFCs, there 
were only a few large MNCs, operating mainly in the developed world, that were 
actually producing CFCs. That made it easier to negotiate an agreement, since there 
were relatively few parties affected by the agreement involved in its negotiation.  
Then, because existing air-conditioning systems could not use the substitute, 
special provisions were made to allow manufacturers to phase out the production of 
equipment which used CFCs while they developed new air-conditioning systems 





designed for the CFC substitute or developed methods to retro-fit existing products to 
use the new chemical. CFC producers were also given time to phase out production of 
CFCs while they ramped up production of the substitute. Countries in the developing 
world were allowed an additional 20 years to phase out their production of CFCs and 
were also provided with tax and monetary incentives to encourage them to do so, 
because they were neither the largest producers nor consumers of CFCs. The success 
of this international agreement to reduce CFCs shows what can be done when nations 
become alarmed enough to take action on a global scale. ―By 1997 world production 
of most ozone-depleting substances had fallen to 76 percent of the 1988 level.‖6  
Part II 
Unfortunately, progress on other environmental issues, such as cutting the CO2 
emissions that contribute to climate change, has been slow to non-existent in most 
countries. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol aimed at cutting greenhouse gas emissions world 
wide, did not even come into effect until 2005 because of the difficulty in getting 
enough states, which in total produced more than 50 percent of these gases, to ratify 
the agreement. In the interim, the United States (US), which was the largest producer 
of such greenhouse gases, decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and China, which 
was the 2
nd
 largest and fastest growing producer of carbon based emissions, has thus 
far refused to take any steps to cut its emissions under the treaty. BBC science analyst 
Tracey Logan notes that many experts believe that Kyoto will be largely ineffective as 
the world's two biggest emitters, the US and China, will not cut their outputs.
7
  
Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol was the most ambitious attempt yet, to 
address a major environmental issue on a global scale. But as is so often the case with 
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complex agreements involving many different countries with competing agendas, 
Kyoto required significant political compromises on the part of nations in both the 
developed world and developing countries. ―Whereas the Kyoto example suggests 
that liberal environmentalism enables international environmental agreements that 
otherwise might have been more difficult to achieve, the irony may be that the kind of 
agreement created may be vastly inadequate to significantly forestall, let alone stop or 
reverse, current trends in greenhouse gas emissions.‖8 In other words, the Kyoto 
Protocol now appears to be just another in a long line of examples of international 
agreements that one could categorize as being ―too little, too late.‖ 
There are a number of factors which add complexity to the issue of dealing 
with green house gas emissions due to burning fossil fuels, like coal, gas, oil and their 
by products. First and foremost is the large number of producers, both in terms of 
countries that rely on extraction of fossil fuels for jobs and export earnings, as well as 
powerful MNCs that have a vested monetary interest in the continued use of coal, oil 
and gas as a source of fuel and energy. Growing economies also need reliable and cost 
efficient sources of energy to address the demands of their consumers and businesses. 
Another aspect involves the many essential uses for carbon based fossil fuels. 
Most of the world‘s electricity is generated by burning coal, oil or natural gas, all of 
which generate green house gas emissions in the process. Natural gas and heating oil 
are the primary means of heating homes and businesses in colder climates and during 
the winter months. Automobile gasoline, jet fuel and diesel fuel, which are all refined 
from oil, power almost all means of transportation in the world. The world‘s many 
agricultural fertilizers, chemicals, synthetic fibres used in rugs, drapes, clothing and 
shoes, as well as detergents, candles, vitamins, cosmetics and all kinds of plastics are 
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made from oil or oil by products. As a result, beyond their essential uses for energy, 
electricity and transportation, thousands of businesses and millions of jobs depend 
either directly or indirectly on the consumption of coal, oil, gas and their by-products. 
The world‘s economy, quite literally, runs on green house gas emitting fossil fuels. 
This leads to the other major complicating factor, which is finding economical 
substitutes to meet the world‘s essential needs for heating, energy, transportation and 
all other products dependent on coal, oil and natural gas. In the classical economics 
model, the search for and development of economical substitutes for any product is 
driven by a need or a desire for lower cost alternatives. But in the case of fossil fuels, 
the accompanying chart in Figure 1 of the ‗real‘ inflation adjusted price of oil, shows 
that the cost of oil had dropped to historically low levels as recently as ten years ago 
in 1998. It was in March 2008 that oil at $96.85 per barrel finally surpassed 1981’s 
historic peak price of $94.97, topping out at $124.40 in July before falling to $36.98. 
Figure 1: Inflation adjusted price of imported oil for past ten years vs. 1981 peak    
                                                       Nominal / Inflation Adj.   
1981 (peak) 38.85 94.97 
Annual December Averages of 
Imported Crude Oil  Prices 
1998-2008 
  









1998 9.39 12.18 
1999 24.35 30.73 
2000 25.19 30.74 
2001 15.95 19.15 
2002 26.68 31.26 
2003 28.63 32.90 
2004 34.17 37.98 
2005 50.85 54.48 
2006 54.99 57.85 
2007 83.21 83.94 
2008 July    127.77  124.40 
2008 December     37.00 36.98 
Source-US Department of Energy 
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Figure 2: Inflation adjusted real vs. nominal price of imported oil past 30 years  



































































































Figure 3: Inflation adjusted real vs. nominal price of gasoline for past 90 years  






























































































Figures 2 & 3 show how cheap oil and gasoline actually are, which hinders the search 
for and development of alternative fuels. This also explains why so few economically 
viable substitutes currently exist, which in turn makes it much more difficult for many 
nations to reach a consensus on how to reduce the world‘s green house gas emissions.   
The reality of the international situation surrounding climate change is that 
any real progress on cutting CO2 emissions has been virtually non-existent. ―Half a 
dozen United Nations (UN) conferences through the 1990s on climate change have 
yielded limited concrete results. Nor has general backing yet developed for a World 
Environment Organization (WEO) that would work on a par with the WTO and other 
global governance organizations.‖9 The ―Earth Summit‖ convened by the UN General 
Assembly and commonly referred to as the 1992 Rio Conference, was widely viewed 
as a success by those concerned about the environment. But it only established a 
―framework‖ for future negotiations on the environment among member states of the 
UN. ―Non-governmental organizations had their own parallel conference in Rio, but 
(for the first time) were also entitled to attend the intergovernmental meetings. The 
Rio Declaration (27 general principles to guide action on environment and 
development), Article 21 (promoting sustainable development), and the Declaration 
of Forest Principles were all agreed, and the conventions on climate change and 
biodiversity were respectively signed by 154 and 150 governments. The Convention 
on Desertification was not ready in time and was not agreed to until June 1994.‖10  
Environmental NGOs also came away from the 1992 Rio Conference with an 
enhanced international standing, which they began using as leverage in pushing 
individual nation states to ratify both the Declaration and the Rio conventions as well 
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as to begin implementing new environmental reforms and regulations. The more 
developed Western countries in Europe and North America, also known as ―states in 
advanced capitalist societies‖ (SIACS), were particularly sensitive to this pressure 
from the NGOs, many of them founded and based in these SIACS. Owen Greene 
observes that; ―Among SIACS the unpalatable implications of many environmental 
policies for key groups of producers and consumers, and the enmeshment of 
problematic environmental practice with the basic routines of everyday life, are such 
that few governments, if any, have shown themselves willing to accept the political 
costs of policies, coercive or catalytic, which might bring economic and social 
practices into line with the requirements of global environmental sustainability.‖11 In 
other words, persuading individual nations to adopt environmental reforms is usually 
as slow and tedious a process as it is getting nations to agree to international accords 
governing environmental practices (or human and labour rights for that matter). 
Many SAICS in Europe which have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
have actually made less progress cutting their rate of growth in green house gas 
emissions than the oft-criticized United States, which has thus far refused to ratify 
Kyoto. ―Total EU emissions of six gases widely considered to be contributing to 
global climate change are estimated to have stood 1.0% higher in 2001, the latest year 
for which data are available, than a year earlier, the annual emissions inventory 
compiled by the European Environment Agency shows. The latest figures show that 
10 of the 15 Member States are heading towards overshooting their agreed share of 
the EU GHG emissions target by a wide margin. This is the case for Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In fact 
Ireland's emissions in 2001 stood 31% higher than in 1990, well over double the 13% 
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increase it is allowed between 1990 and 2008 - 2012.‖12  The following EU chart 
illustrates its lack of progress cutting green house gases to meet its Kyoto obligations. 
Figure 4: Total EU greenhouse gas emissions in relation to the Kyoto target 
 
While the United States (US) has made some progress in slowing its rate of 
growth in green house gas emissions, that progress was slowed markedly due to the 
change in political leadership that occurred in 2001. The new Republican presidential 
administration of George W. Bush, backed by a Republican majority in Congress, 
steadfastly refused to implement regulations governing green house gas CO2 
emissions despite its obligations to do so under the US Clean Air Act. In its legal 
filings before the US Supreme Court, the Bush administration argued it did not have 
the right to regulate carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases under the Clean Air 
Act, and that even if it did, it would not use the authority. However, ―In one of its 
most important environmental decisions in years, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to regulate heat-trapping gases in 
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automobile emissions. The court further ruled that the agency could not sidestep its 
authority to regulate the greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change. 
The 5-to-4 decision (April 2, 2007) was a strong rebuke to the Bush administration.‖13  
President Bush also announced his intention to rescind the previous 
Democratic President‘s agreement to abide by the Kyoto Protocol shortly after he 
took office in 2001. He justified his decision by citing his concern that China was not 
obligated to cut its emissions under Kyoto and that the emissions cuts the US was 
obligated to make under the protocol would cause serious damage to the US economy.  
In fact China has recently surpassed the US as the world‘s largest polluter and source 
of green house gas emissions, but as a developing country in 1997 when Kyoto was 
approved, it is not obligated to cut its CO2 emissions. But it should also be noted that 
the largest developing countries, such as China and India, are expected to have some 
obligations to cut emissions after the Kyoto Protocol agreement expires in 2012. 
Conclusions and Alternatives 
There are significant differences between the international community 
achieving governance agreements which regulate the production of ozone depleting 
substances and making similar agreements governing greenhouse gases or other 
environmental concerns. Regarding the successful international ozone protocol ―The 
successive negotiations and protocols of the 1970s and 1980s enabled a common 
international framework for negotiations to emerge, and aided the establishment of a 
scientific consensus in the face of uncertainty. On the basis of this it proved politically 
possible to transform the production and consumption of CFCs, first in the West (and 
Europe), and then, through new financial mechanisms, in the South (and Asia). 
However, the speed of negotiations, when measured against the pace of 
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environmental degradation, looks alarmingly sluggish and the simplicity of the 
politics of ozone depletion (few producers, possible [economical] substitutes, many 
non-essential uses) is unlikely to be replicated in other environmental contexts.‖14  
The political complexity of the problem involving greenhouse gases (i.e. 
numerous producers, few economical substitutes and many essential uses) is such that 
it is hard to envision any international agreement on this issue being as achievable or 
successful as the agreement on ozone depletion. Because of the difficulty in achieving 
and implementing national policies and international environmental agreements in a 
timely manner during the years following the 1992 Rio conference, some 
environmental NGOs have come to the conclusion that a more expeditious way to 
address their environmental concerns might be through the use of existing 
international agreements and public international law. 
International courts and arbitration tribunals have traditionally taken a very 
narrow view when ruling on attempts by countries to regulate the environmental 
practices of neighbouring states which have an adverse impact on their own 
population and environment. It wasn‘t until a pre-WTO ruling in 1957, that an 
international court first recognized the need to address the ‗common interests of 
everybody‘. ―Thus, in the Lac Lanoux case (1957) the Arbitral Tribunal, while (still) 
taking a traditional view of international law regulating relations between 
neighbouring states, alluded to the possibility of natural resources such as the water of 
a lake being exploited ‗in the common interests of everybody‘.‖15 Today, it is WTO 
arbitration panel rulings which are recognized as being the most significant 
contributor to the public international law which governs relations between states.  
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Thus, international trade agreements under the auspices of the WTO appear to 
be one of the best avenues for NGOs to pursue because of the economic consequences 
countries are likely to suffer should they decide to ignore WTO decisions. In the past 
the difficulty for NGOs in pursuing this course of action has been persuading the 
WTO to agree to link environmental issues with trade disputes pursuant to Article XX 
(g), which permits states to embargo goods ―as a measure related to the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources.‖16 Prior to 1998, environmental NGOs had also been 
stymied by previous arbitration panels‘ refusal to accept their ―third party‖ briefs in 
trade disputes involving environmental issues. 
In the Shrimp–Turtles dispute, the WTO Appellate Body not only agreed to 
accept NGO briefs, but went even further in its decision to overturn portions of the 
arbitration panels ruling against the US. The arbitral panel in the Shrimp–Turtles 
dispute had interpreted Article XX in the same way as previous panels in Tuna-
Dolphin cases. ―By selecting a limited ―object and purpose,‖ the Panel predetermined 
that measures having an environmental object and purpose could not be justified 
under art. XX. The Panel concluded that derogations from other provisions of GATT 
are permissible under art. XX only so long as they ‗do not undermine the multilateral 
trading system.‖17  
The WTO Appellate Body firmly rejected this line of reasoning and in so 
doing effectively rejected the reasoning used in the previous Tuna-Dolphin cases as 
well. The Appellate Body rejected the panel‘s decision to interpret the chapeau of 
Article XX so narrowly that it was effectively rendered useless by virtue of the 
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panel‘s decision that the US import ban was ―not within the scope of measures 
permitted under the chapeau of Article XX.‖18 The Appellate Body interpreted and 
viewed the chapeau of Article XX in a completely different context than the panel by 
―finding that it is intended to prevent abuse of the exceptions listed in art. XX,‖19 The 
Shrimp-Turtle panel had interpreted the chapeau from a much different perspective, 
reasoning that it was meant to severely limit the use of Article XX‘s exceptions. 
 ―The Appellate Body further criticized the panel for examining compliance 
with the chapeau prior to determining compliance with any of the following 
exceptions. It is not possible to determine whether an exception is being abused 
without first determining whether the exception is otherwise available.  In fact, the 
Appellate Body completely rejected the panel‘s line of reasoning stating that:  
―conditioning access to a Member's domestic market on whether exporting Members 
comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing 
Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures falling within the 
scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX.‖20 With these 
rulings the WTO Appellate Body significantly modified existing international trade 
law (as well as the  public international law it is a part of) by establishing a new 
interpretation of Article XX for the purpose of guiding future arbitration panels‘ 
reasoning in trade disputes involving environmental issues.  
Thanks to the Appellate Body decision; ―Article XX (g) has been interpreted 
broadly. The Shrimp-Turtle appellate decision strengthens the right of the state to 
adopt conservation measures (sympathetic to environmental NGO concerns) by a 
                                                 
18
 WTO Panel Report, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/R (98-1710), 15 May 1998 paragraph 7.62 
19





liberal interpretation of ‗exhaustible natural resources‘‖21 In the absence of any other 
world body, such as the oft suggested World Environment Organization (WEO), the 
only existing international institution within the framework of public international law 
that is in a position to mediate and adjudicate environmental issues and global trade 
disputes, is the WTO. However, ―The WTO must strike a balance between two 
extremes. Cracking down too hard on the use of environmental trade restrictions 
invites environmental damage. But excessive leniency in imposing sanctions invites 
two other abuses; pressure on poorer countries to adopt standards that are ill suited to 
their strained economies; and suppression of trade that will lead to higher prices and 
stunted growth.‖22 Environmental NGOs should also become sensitive to this issue. 
This analysis confirms the idea held by some environmentalists, that the best 
allies for NGOs would be sympathetic WTO member states that are willing to 
implement environmentally friendly trade policies and also apply them fairly. Had the 
US applied its shrimp import ban fairly in Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body would 
have likely overturned the arbitration panel‘s ruling against the US‘s trade related 
environmental protection measures. As such, the WTO could also become a strong 
potential ally in regulating green house gas emissions. But environmental NGOs will 
have to be pragmatic when proposing to use trade policies to protect the environment 
since ―Global trade/eco-pragmatism recognizes that treaties dealing with trade and the 
environment, as well as interpretation and implementation of these treaties are human 
creations; therefore, results will be complex, uncertain and sometimes inconsistent.‖23  
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Should the US and the EU ever be able to get on the same page regarding the 
reduction of green house gas emissions, their combined economic power could be 
brought to bear on other states which are not taking appropriate steps to regulate green 
house gas and CO2 emissions. Trade related restrictions such as carbon taxes or tariffs 
on offending countries‘ imports would likely be supported by WTO arbitration panels, 
provided that such trade restrictions were applied fairly with respect to all WTO 
member states. This is by no means the ideal solution to deal with climate change or 
global warming; it‘s just a practical suggestion for using existing laws and treaties. 
So how exactly should environmental NGOs and climate scientists go about 
persuading governments to be more sympathetic to their environmental concerns and 
to implement trade related environmental restrictions? While the approach used by 
former US Vice President Al Gore of appealing to mass audiences is not without its 
merits, there is another approach which might be far more effective. 
In addition to using the news media to publicize their concerns and the need 
for more concrete actions on the part of both consumers and businesses, 
environmentalists should also concentrate on developing relationships with their 
native country‘s business and social elites. If local and national business and social 
elites can be convinced that there is an urgent need for action, they will ensure that 
elected government officials and un-elected bureaucrats or policymakers cooperate. 
But soliciting the active support of business and social elites requires the use 
of what is referred to by marketing professionals as ―consultative selling skills.‖ 
―Consultative selling translates to promoting goal congruence and providing solutions 
to problems encountered for the mutual benefit of both parties involved‖24 More 
specifically, it entails taking the time to conduct one on one interviews with the party 
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one wishes to forge an alliance with and then actively listening to their concerns 
without discussing one‘s own agenda.  
In order to succeed in promulgating workable climate change solutions, 
environmentalists must first come to an understanding of what it is like to be in the 
shoes of those whose support you are seeking. For instance, businesspeople concerned 
about current and future profitability, need to be assured that making their business 
practices more environmentally friendly won‘t adversely affect their profitability. To 
that end, environmental NGOs and climate scientists must be able to make use of risk 
analysis skills and utilize business case tactics in order to convince reluctant business 
owners and corporate executives. They must also employ relationship skills and 
consultative sales tactics to find out what issues are of the utmost personal importance 
to influential business and social elites, so that they can craft environmental proposals 
in such a way that these concerns are also addressed in the process.      
. But what is ultimately needed is either a trans-national state (TNS) or more 
international institutions such as a World Environment Organization (WEO), with 
enough regulatory and governance powers to protect society and the environment 
from the negative impacts of climate change. As William I. Robinson noted some 
years ago, in this way ―the nation-state is neither retaining its (former) primacy nor 
disappearing but becoming transformed and absorbed into this larger structure of a 
TNS.‖25 Only the emergence of NGOs and the TNS, or an international environmental 
institution similar to the WTO (i.e. WEO) can address the negative effects of climate 
change on society. A TNS, or a WEO with strong regulatory powers, might also be 
capable of more effectively regulating markets and protecting the human, labour and 
environmental rights of all societies in an increasingly globalized economic world.  
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